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COMMENTARY
Toothless Tigers? A Commentary on Alec
Murphy’s ‘Trapped in the Logic of the
Modern State System?’
MARTIN MÜLLER
Universität St. Gallen, Switzerland, and Goethe-Universität Frankfurt, Germany
THE EU – SUPRA-STATE OR POSTMODERN POLITICAL FORM?
In February 2012 the European Commission released a video that was
intended to promote the idea of European union among younger people.1
It shows a white woman, dressed in a golden jumpsuit, that is threatened
by three men preparing to fight her. First a man, ostensibly from East Asia,
jumps down in front of her performing Kung Fu. Then a practitioner of
Kalaripayattu, a southern Indian martial art, levitates towards her brandish-
ing a sabre and finally a black man cartwheels in, menacing the woman
with Capoeira moves. The woman stays calm, splits into twelve versions of
herself to surround the assailants, who then vanish as the twelve women
turn into the twelve stars of the EU flag, accompanied by the message “The
more we are, the stronger we are”. The video, an attempt at viral communi-
cation, was retracted a few days after it was released – for obvious reasons.
Propagating racialised threats to Europe, it is a thinly veiled attempt at pro-
moting European unity through stoking geopolitical fears of China, India and
Brazil, making individuals stand in for whole states. Its message is in tune
with what Alexander Murphy diagnoses in his paper: a view of the EU as
a supra-state, which is in competition with other states, and the drawing of
clear boundaries of who belongs there and who does not.2
Alexander Murphy’s intervention comes at a critical juncture, when the
EU is arguably at a watershed. It is on the cusp of a closer fiscal union, while
at the same time much of what has been achieved over the past decades is at
risk of falling to pieces. The potential shape of things to come with taking the
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latter path has been foreshadowed in the cleavages of the last months: Britain
wanting to go it alone, a string of political backsliding in Eastern European
countries such as Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia and a rekindling
of nationalist sentiments. ‘Divided we stand, united we fall’ seems to be
the new motto. The spring 2012 wave of the Pew Global Attitudes Project
shows that in most European nations public opinion has swung against EU
membership and that there is a significant degree of hostility between some
member states such as Germany and Greece, with 49% of Greeks holding a
very unfavourable opinion of Germany.3
Coordinating fiscal policies in Brussels, however, would mean walk-
ing further down the road of the modernist territorial logic that Murphy
identifies, ceding ever more powers of the national state to supra-national
bodies. It would mean, Murphy argues, reinforcing the neat scalar hierar-
chies of supra-national, national, regional, local, at the expense of alternative
metageographies of overlapping spatialities, such as those of transboundary
networks or interregional cooperation arrangements, that would deserve the
label of what John Ruggie claimed might be ‘the first truly postmodern inter-
national political form’.4 In arguing for transcending traditional state spaces
through non-state or extra-state forms of cooperation, Murphy situates his
argument in the growing call for alternative models and visions of European
integration among geographers, whether it is non-territorial metaphors of
translation and mediation, a plea against containerisation and for more fluid
shapes, an inclusive regional dialogue in the European neighbourhood or
Europe as a post-national and multi-ethnic migrant space.5
It is hard to disagree on normative grounds with the vision Murphy
sketches, for it is indeed an appealing one. But I would like to argue that
we might be presented with a somewhat different picture if we look not
only at the formal arrangements and the narrative on integration, but also at
how these are practiced.6 There are three substantive aspects I would like
to raise. First, much can be gained from viewing the scalar hierarchies in the
EU as not quite as discrete and pre-ordained as they might appear, but as
produced through multiple socio-material relations. Second, the geographies
of the euro do not map onto a modern territorial logic in a straightforward
fashion but keep overflowing the rigid EMU framework. Third, most regional
initiatives tend to be toothless tigers and the potential ceding of power to
the EU in the wake of the current crisis might, after all, be more conducive
to European unity, both in a political and in a social sense.
THE EU AS ALWAYS LOCAL
Murphy points out that European Monetary Union (EMU) required national
governments to divest themselves of decision-making power and centralise


























reinforce the EU’s capacity as a political-territorial actor and ‘bringing into
being a large-scale unit that looked and functioned increasingly like a state’.7
But if we look beyond the formal distribution of responsibilities, we might
find that the scalar territorial logic is not quite as clear-cut as it might appear
at first. Even the seemingly highest echelons of the European Commission
in Brussels or the ECB in Frankfurt are and in fact have to be connected to,
say, the bank clerk in the small provincial town of Kößlarn in Bavaria. These
connections are, for example, effected through technology, such as software
for financial markets, that governs and regulates flows of capital and extends
the power of the ECB across space. But the bank clerk is also connected
to his colleague in the neighbouring branch in Rotthalmünster, because they
play in the same football team. And after the game they sometimes talk
about how they assess the creditworthiness of clients and the loopholes
that the current rules offer to still accommodate those clients who are going
through rough patches at the moment, bypassing some of the hierarchical
arrangements.
Instead of viewing the EU as carved up in multiple levels, then, one
could adopt an alternative perspective and ask how these levels are the
product of a larger actor-network, despite the formal subordination that may
exist. I am taking my cue from Bruno Latour here, who suggests that all
organisations, even those that look large and complex, are after all contin-
uously local: ‘If we wander about inside IBM, if we follow the chains of
command of the Red Army, if we inquire in the corridors of the Ministry of
Education, . . . we never leave the local level. Could IBM be made up of
a series of local interactions? The Red Army of an aggregate of conversa-
tions in the mess hall? The Ministry of Education of a mountain of pieces of
paper?’8 Instead of taking the EU as one big organisation, one could ask how
it is made up of multiple socio-material relations that need to be actualised
again and again for it to emerge as an actor and how scales are enacted (or
perhaps not) in this process.9
THE OVERFLOWING GEOGRAPHIES OF THE EURO
The usage of the euro is a case in point that illustrates how a product of the
modern territorial system overflows the hierarchical state space that created
and regulates it. Some of this usage is authorised by the European Central
Bank, such as in Monaco, the Vatican, Andorra and San Marino, which have
concluded monetary agreements granting them issuing rights. Another vari-
ant is the pegging of a currency to the euro, as is the case with Bulgaria,
Morocco and several other countries.
Of much greater interest here are those cases, however, where the euro
is used without official sanctioning of the ECB, called euroisation. Kosovo
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FIGURE 1 The euro as a parallel and de facto currency: Euro-denominated bank loans in
countries outside the euro area (color figure available online).
In many other countries in Central and Eastern Europe it functions as a
parallel currency to local currencies, either in cash transactions or for assets
and liabilities (see Figure 1). Estimates put the amount of euro banknotes
circulating outside the eurozone in 2011 at between 20 and 25% of the
total,10 most of them in countries adjacent to the EU. In 2006, residents of
Croatia held an annual average of more than EUR 500 per capita in cash.11 In
countries like Croatia or Serbia, more than half of all loans are denominated
in euros, with even higher shares in Latvia and Lithuania.12 Despite recent
dips in confidence, the euro is still more trusted than the local currencies and



























A significant part of the usage of the euro thus falls outside the juris-
diction of the ECB, but also outside the reach of the monetary policies of
the affected countries, in practice overturning the rigid scalar hierarchies that
the EMU mandates. These unintended overflows, as Michel Callon would
call them,13 frequently bypass official channels and bring into being infor-
mal networks, integrating individuals into the eurozone where the respective
countries are often unlikely to join the EMU. The effects of these overflows
tend to undermine state authority: often tied to informal economic activi-
ties, they facilitate tax evasion and rent seeking and weaken governments’
capacity to engage in effective macroeconomic interventions. On the other
hand, however, the stability of the euro makes it more suitable for storing
or transferring value and engaging in long-term economic planning, which
is often difficult with the volatile inflation of local currencies.
TOOTHLESS TIGERS
The overflows of the euro outside the territorial system of the EMU have
had a significant impact on people’s everyday lives in many neighbouring
countries. This is much less the case with most cross-border initiatives in
the EU, which tend to be rather toothless tigers. Murphy names a number of
them as examples of a non-territorial metageographical imagination: the Four
Motors Agreement, the Alliance of European Lawyers in Brussels, Erasmus,
ESPON and CORINE. Ask a representative sample of EU citizens what part of
the EU has had the largest impact on their lives and it is likely that the euro
or food regulation dictating the curvature of cucumbers will come to mind
first, whereas the Four Motors, ESPON or the Alliance of European Lawyers
are more likely to draw quizzical looks.
Take INTERREG, the flagship of European cross-border spatial develop-
ment and territorial cooperation, which is designed to diminish the influence
of national borders and create greater European cohesion. With a budget
of EUR 7.8 billion for the period from 2007 to 2013 it may look like a
heavyweight, but it in fact receives only 2.6% of the total funds for regional
policy, the rest being allocated to territorial development. What is more, the
importance of territorial cooperation in spatial planning has been severely
downgraded in the recent edition and much of the programme has been
refocused on promoting jobs and growth instead of cooperation. One major
reason for this might be the significant gap between the programmatic aim
of promoting transborder development and planning and the moderate out-
comes of INTERREG in this regard, which often enough follow particularist
rationales.14
This is not to say that such initiatives are not important, but as long
as they are not undergirded by the concomitant regulatory or prescriptive
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the current euro crisis that its cause was too little instead of too much power
given to the EU: one of the central design flaws of the euro, according to
economists, is to attempt a currency union without a fiscal and political union
that would help in coordinating budgeting, taxes, health care, labour policies
and so on. Gaining such power, however, will require member states to cede
it in the first place. Murphy is sceptical whether giving more power to the EU
will produce greater unity. I believe it can, because it is likely to also create
a greater shared sense of being affected by and responsible for the same
policies, no matter whether you live in Frankfurt or on Korfu. It might help
institutionalise a stronger awareness of being in the same boat – something
that seems to be sorely missing from many discussions on whether or not
Greece should exit the euro area. In a sense then, the current crisis might be
the best thing that ever happened to the European project: it can become a
catalyst for closer integration and in fact achieve something that, because of
nationalist sentiments and particularist interests, our wildest dreams would
not have allowed us to imagine just a few years ago.
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